“Public interest” is a term used by standard setters. As noted in the paper, “While it is widely agreed that accountants and accounting ought to serve the public interest (Baker, 2005; Sikka et al.,1989), what this means is unclear and contested” (p 394). The authors pick three concepts of the public interest that are most relevant to social impact standards.
1. Aggregative: This conception sees public interest as the sum of private interests and can be calculated using utility maximization and cost-benefit models. “Aggregative models of the public interest invoke a view of society as comprised of isolated, self-interested individuals, with no intrinsic concern for a wider public beyond their own utility” (p 395). The aggregative model is closely aligned with neo-classical economics. It is closely associated with the notion that the role of the standard setter “is to facilitate the smooth operation of markets or to create and sustain quasi-markets in areas – like natural monopolies or public goods – where markets do not naturally arise” (p. 395).
2. Processual: This conception sees “public interest as a process of managing conflicting views and interests” (p 395), based on the idea that “there is no public to possess a single interest, only groups possessing diverse interests” (p. 395; this is a direct quote from Dellaporas & Davenport, 2009 p 1085). Whereas the aggregative concept imagines that public interest can be calculated, the processual model does not. Instead, the processual model focuses on a fair procedure for hearing and adjudicating among interests. “From this view, individuals should be engaged in a dialogue about their interests and how public policy can meet them” (p. 395). The role of the standard-setter is to “ensure the procedure of managing conflicting interests runs smoothly” and to provide “the concepts and measures a smooth process requires” (p 396).
3. Common good: This conception of public interests “equates the public interest with a common good” (p 396, emphasis in original). This approach argues that “the public “whole” has interest beyond its constitutive individual “(p 396). For example, it can include relationships between groups. It notes that ways of flourishing often depend on relationships. Further, this approach “includes commitments to shared norms or values beyond due process alone” (p 396). This commitment to shared norms and values necessitates sensitivity to a specific community’s “local context” (p. 397, emphasis in original). The shared norms and values become known not through calculation or revealed preferences but through “dialogue with community members” (p 397 emphasis in original). Under this conception, the role of the standard setter is to “sustain shared ideals and relationships, which markets may or may not advance” (p 396) and specifically through “more direct and embodied engagements with particular people in the communities they inhabit and sustain” (p 397, emphasis in original).